Non Voter Rationalization Thesis Statements


Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton during their final debate, in Las Vegas on Oct. 19. (Carlos Barria/Reuters)

We have a moral duty to vote. Some have argued that that’s not so. The most prominent opponents of the duty include philosophers Jason Brennan, Loren Lomasky and Geoffrey Brennan. Here are their three most common arguments — and the reasons they’re wrong.

1. There are better ways to help society and promote the common good than by voting.

If we care about civic duty, there are many ways to be a good citizen other than voting. For example, we can give to charity, heal the sick, make art, teach, work productively in ways that create jobs and much else.

But just because there are many ways to further the common good doesn’t mean we can fail basic obligations required of us by our conscience.

[Yes, you do have an obligation to vote for the lesser of two evils. Here’s why.]

An analogy will help to clarify this point. Imagine that your good friend is using crutches, and you are both waiting for a bus to arrive. Your friend would benefit from your assistance to board the bus. The effort to help him board the bus would not be unduly difficult or strenuous for you.

Your friend also happens to have a lot of credit card debt. While the bus is approaching, you hand him a check and say, “Take this money to pay your bills, but I’m not going to help you get onto the bus.”

Your monetary help deserves praise. But your friend still needs you to help him board the bus.

Voting involves a similar choice. The quality of government significantly affects every person in society. Elections offer us a relatively easy way to improve society if we vote and end up choosing decent governments. Donating to charity (or any of a number of other  acts) may be virtuous, but it does not affect the lives of every person as profoundly as electing capable, civic-minded leaders. Furthermore, the idea that working in the market can pass as a dutiful act seems to stretch the concept of duty, which requires that the act done is not primarily motivated by self-interest but by the welfare of others.

2. Voting is like farming. It would be catastrophic if nobody farmed, but that does not mean we each have an obligation to become farmers.

This is a mistaken comparison. In contemporary societies like ours, farming is a line of work, an activity people do to make a living. It is for profit. The fact that it benefits society is an unintended consequence. No democracy that takes freedom seriously should infringe on the right of occupational choice by demanding that people farm.

[This map will change how you think about American voters — especially white, small-town, heartland voters]

But healthy democracies do curtail our freedom when they require that we serve as jurors, that we fight for our country in times of war, that we pay taxes and, more trivially, that we recycle our trash. These activities are burdensome; as individuals, we don’t necessarily gain from them. However, society does gain, quite a bit, when its citizens shoulder these collective burdens. Why should voting be any different?

3. Voting is futile from a utilitarian and instrumental standpoint.

Economists say voting is irrational. The time that one must commit to educate oneself about the candidates and issues, together with the time it actually takes to vote, outweighs the benefit to the individual and society of that person’s vote. In this view, each individual vote is a proverbial drop in the bucket that cannot affect the election’s outcome, given the total number of votes cast. Thus, no duty can require us to do something that will have zero impact on the world.

The locus classicus for the view that voting is irrational, which would shape political science for decades to come, was Anthony Down’s “An Economic Theory of Democracy.” This is the point of departure for opponents of the duty to vote.

But this claim misunderstands how instrumental rationality and utilitarianism operate. Utilitarianism requires that we contribute to increasing the overall welfare of society. It doesn’t require that our acts have a significant impact on their own or in our own individual lives. Neither does it require that the impact of our action is always the greatest it could be.

We are instrumentally rational when we choose a means that will further an end reasonably well. If our tiny contribution to a collective activity is added to many similar contributions that will together produce a highly desirable outcome, we may still act consistently with instrumental rationality. We may also act consistently with a utilitarian logic because we know that the final outcome of the collective project is highly beneficial for society.

Furthermore, every year there are elections that are decided by a handful of votes. This happens far more frequently than one might guess statistically. It may be unlikely that an individual’s single vote will determine the outcome of elections, but it may still add marginally to the set of votes needed to gain a majority.

Likewise, our vote may add, however modestly, to the margin of victory of our preferred candidate. That strengthens our candidate’s mandate and practical ability to govern without stalemate. Marginal contributions add up.

Lastly, many of us believe that a person ought not to vote unless he or she is well versed on the candidates and issues. But a single bad vote is unlikely to tip an election to a bad candidate. Further, it will also likely be offset by another uninformed voter’s vote for the other candidate.

[Do shark attacks swing elections?]

If the individual act of refraining from voting badly will not make a discernible impact, we should not view voting with information as a duty that only makes sense if a single ballot can have an impact  by itself. It will not, and that is just fine.

John Stuart Mill said in his essay “Considerations on Representative Government” that the vote gives us power over other people. Voting with knowledge and a sense of justice can be a truly effective way to aid society by acting in concert, even if it’s not the only way or the best way at all times. Hannah Arendt was surely wrong when, in her book “On Violence,” she wrote, “The booth in which we deposit our ballots is unquestionably too small, for this booth has room for only one.”

Voting is anything but solitary. We must see it as a collective endeavor if it is to mean anything at all for democracy.

Julia Maskivkeris an associate professor of political theory in the political science department at Rollins College in Florida.

Political psychological rationalization (PPR) is a phenomenon seen in political warfare and election campaign rhetoric, meant to displace a perceived fault, short coming, mistake, or problem from one political actor, and attach it to another political actor, generally an opponent. While not truly rationalization in the context of psychology—where a problem, short coming, mistake, or fault is justified and allowed to endure—PPR maintains the negative connotation of the original flaw, transfers that connotation to a target actor, and then seeks to destroy the flaw (and consequently the actor) through association with said flaw, but with a political purpose and focus. Political psychological rationalization exploits a number of psychological principles to manipulate the perceptions of different actors including groupthink, cognitive dissonance, and other forms of psychological manipulation. An example of PPR would be "Candidate A" accusing "Candidate B" of having an onerous tax policy for not cutting taxes while Candidate A had already raised taxes previously in his or her career, but having accused Candidate B of having an onerous tax policy is seen as being in favor of cutting taxes. Use of PPR can also run the risk of backfiring against the broadcaster if knowledge of hypocritical behavior on the part of the displacing political actor becomes known. In cases where this has happened, the original negative association can become reoriented back to the initiating political actor. As tool of political warfare, PPR has been used by a wide array of factions, ideologies, actors, and regimes including fascists, communists, religious extremists, electoral campaign rhetoric, and non-governmental organizations.

Psychological influences[edit]

As a tool of political warfare, PPR utilizes a number of psychological and sociological concepts, but is not truly rationalization in a classical psychology context. In psychology, rationalization is generally an internal (and usually subconscious) coping mechanism used to justify actions and decisions arrived at through alternative logic paths[1]—but in a political context, rationalization is usually an external (and almost always conscious) justification used to create a specific association for the target audience. In theory, a political actor using PPR could exploit the phenomenon of group think (whereby an idea has unfounded credibility because many members of a particular group adhere to it in a desire to maintain cohesion)[2] to rationalize a particular political position. In some cases, PPR might also be a defense mechanism against being branded with a negative image by an opponent through active exploitation of cognitive dissonance, creating alternative messages to rationalize a real or perceived inconsistency in policy or a previous attack by an opponent.[3] Due to the highly subjective nature of both broadcaster and target audience perceptions, it is difficult to definitively label a particular messaging campaign as being an example of PPR.

Use in American electoral campaign rhetoric[edit]

One of the most controversial examples of PPR in American electoral rhetoric is President Lyndon Johnson's use of the Daisy ad against Senator Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential campaign, which was used to create an image of his opponent as belligerent and reactionary in foreign affairs. The ad depicted a small girl counting the petals on a daisy. The camera slowly zooms in on the girl while the counting by the girl is replaced by a loudspeaker counting down to zero, at which point the picture changes from the girl counting petals to a nuclear explosion. Johnson's voice is then overheard saying,

"These are the stakes – to make a world in which all of God's children can live, or to go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die."[4]

The ad also urged people to vote for President Johnson. While no intended target of the ad was ever specified, the implication was that if one voted against Johnson, they would be voting for nuclear war. The ad was only ever aired once due to intense negative reaction from the public, but the association with nuclear war followed Senator Goldwater for the rest of the election.[5] President Johnson by default became associated with moderation and peace, even though he had endorsed the domino theory as John F. Kennedy's vice-president in 1961, creating a predisposition to expanding the Vietnam War in 1965 after the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

Use during the Cold War[edit]

A protracted political warfare campaign was waged between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, in which both sides made extensive use of PPR.It consisted of the multiple accusations of government officials from the Communist Bloc and the West. In particular, the PPR was objectified in the struggle of each side to justify its political shortcomings by vilifying the ideology of the opponent. The ban of Western media and Western culture in the Soviet countries was an attempt by Kremlin to limit any potential for growing Western influence in these societies. Moreover, communist societies were becoming more eager for the culture of consumerism and the access to the goods and services available in capitalist societies.[6] In order to frame the censorship into a positive context and to rationalize the censorship[7], the Soviet regime was openly opposing Western culture with the argument that it was a source of the detrimental bourgeois influence[8] threatening the values of the communist society. The official and unofficial state measures undertaken against the Western culture was portrayed by the Soviet regime as a mechanism for protection of the population against the low morality of the decadent capitalistic society. Some acts of the modern Russian leadership also point to the same tendency even after the end of the Cold War. Namely, the Orthodox Christian community is the institution supposed to provide a protection from the 'Western philosophy of drugs, egotism and moral relativism'.[9]

As for the PPR on American side, some examples are also present. Between 1946 to 1956, there was a censorship campaign against schools and libraries in an effort to remove literature, described as 'radical'. The political move was explained through the danger that such literature was posing to the American democracy[10]. During 1950s the members of the Communist party and supporters of their ideas were persecuted and faced hostilities and rejection both by the side of the government and the society[11]. The anti-Soviet sentiment in America during the first half of the Cold War was measured to be greater than in European countries that were directly facing the consequences of the communist ideology.[12] Another example of the American use of PPR during the Cold War is the fallacy of the "missile gap". Claims that the Soviet Union was outpacing the United States in production numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and would soon be at a disadvantage, surfaced during the late 1950s[13] and had peaked by the election of 1960. Although it had been disproven by the intelligence community, political elites continued to use the missile gap for their own gains. In this case however, the objective of PPR was not so much to demonize the Soviet Union (in fact, that had already been rhetorically established), but to create a perceived US deficiency to spur US action on the issue. Since any evidence invalidating the missile gap theory was classified, no cognitive dissonance was required to defend the rationalization that the US needed more strategic weapons, and group think could be harnessed to keep the conversation centered on strategic weapons, as opposed to other fronts on which the US could be countering the Soviets. The reality of this rationalization is that there was indeed a missile gap during this time period, but in favor of the United States.

Examples in contemporary international relations[edit]

The use of PPR has become prevalent in the public diplomacy campaigns of religious extremists, particularly radical Islamist groups. While rhetorically attacking the United States and its allies as being "crusaders" out to impose their ideals on the Muslim world, many groups claiming to resist that trend blame the state of the Muslim world immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on a failure of the umma to resist as well, leaving only the jihadist groups left to carry on the struggle, like Al Qaeda.[14] By claiming to resist a perceived invader, these groups can then associate themselves with an image of benevolence while demonizing the United States—despite committing many of the same excesses of which they accuse the United States, such as labeling other Muslims "infidels" who support the US, and imposing (theological) norms onto populations that do not necessarily share them.

Political psychological rationalization also continues to factor into modern public diplomacy efforts as a means to predispose target audiences to a message from a broadcasting actor. Aspects of PPR can be seen in the current media campaign surrounding China's peaceful rise, and how certain actions taken by the Chinese government are portrayed in both official statements and the larger news media. A commonly repeated theme is that China's military modernization and expansion is a reflection of growth in the Chinese economy and presence abroad.[15] This is a rationalization in response to a perception that the expanding nature of the Chinese military will result in increased Chinese aggressiveness. By using the term "peaceful rise" and seeking to portray the military expansion as part of a country's natural development, China is attempting to displace the fear (other countries) and perceived aggression (by China) and displace the negative implicated with its military growth and attach them to nations attempting to challenge China by creating the image that anyone who worries about China is merely paranoid or jealous of China's development. In repeated use of this rationalization, China is conditioning observing parties to think that the "peaceful rise" is the norm, using group think to delegitimize opponents and cognitive dissonance to rebut any mention of inconsistencies in official messaging from the Chinese government.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^Cherry, Kendra. "Defense Mechanisms: Rationalization". About.com. Retrieved 22 April 2012. 
  2. ^"Groupthink". Definition Groupthink. Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved 22 April 2012. 
  3. ^Cherry, Kendra. "What is Cognitive Dissonance". About.com. Retrieved 22 April 2012. 
  4. ^"Transcript of 'Peace, Little Girl' 1964 Democratic Campaign". Copy from LBJ Library via CONELRAD. http://conelrad.com/daisy/documents.php. 1964. Retrieved 22 April 2012.
  5. ^"Correspondence regarding The Daisy Ad from Senator Everett M. Dirksen." Copy from LBJ library via CONELRAD. http://conelrad.com/daisy/documents.php. 12 September 1964. Retrieved 22 April 2012.
  6. ^Bren, Paulina; Neuburger, Mary, eds. (2012). Communism unwrapped: Consumption in cold war Eastern Europe. Oxford University Press. 
  7. ^Gulyás, Ágnes (2001). "Communist media economics and the consumers: The case of the print media of East Central Europe". International Journal of Media Management. 3 (2): 74-81. 
  8. ^Poiger, Uta (2000). Jazz, rock, and rebels: Cold War politics and American culture in a divided Germany. University of California Press. 
  9. ^Van Herpen, Marcel (2015). Putin's propaganda machine: Soft power and russian foreign policy. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 162. 
  10. ^Mediavilla, Cindy (1997). "The war on books and ideas: The California Library Association and anti-communist censorship in the 1940s and 1950s". Library Trends. 46 (2): 331–347. 
  11. ^L. Sullivan, John; Piereson, James; E. Marcus, George (1993). Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1993). Political tolerance and American democracy. University of Chicago Press. 
  12. ^Wald, Kenneth (1994). "The Religious Dimension of American Anti-Communism". Journal of Church and State. 36 (3): 483-506. 
  13. ^Central Intelligence Agency. "Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-5-58". 25 November 1958. Retrieved 23 April 2012.
  14. ^Scheuer, Michael. "Al-Qaeda Doctrine: Training the Individual Warrior". Terrorism Focus Volume: 3 Issue: 12. The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 23 April 2012. 
  15. ^"China's military rise: The Dragon's New Teeth". The Economist. 7 April 2012. Retrieved 22 April 2012. 

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